Learning about a CEO's unknown talent takes time and her incentives should rise as the board learns over her tenure with the firm. Using the ExecuComp data set from 1992 to 2007, we examine the trajectory of pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) in the years immediately after CEOs assume their positions, along with firm value consequences. We show that target incentives are not achieved instantaneously, but instead evolve through a process by which CEO incentives increase gradually before eventually leveling off. Further, consistent with standard agency theory, we find that firm value, as measured by Tobin's Q, rises along with this gradual increase in CEO incentives. Using two other measures (inside or outside CEOs and years before promotion) to further proxy for the learning process, we find more consistent, corroborating evidence.
I. INTRODUCTION
Pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) is a key element in a well-designed compensation contract that provides an agent with the appropriate level of incentives. A large body of research has documented the positive relation between CEO compensation and performance (see Jensen and Murphy 1990; Haubrich 1994; Hall and Liebman 1998;  among others). But there has been little research systematically examining the evolution of CEO incentives under a dynamic perspective, and the impact of this evolution on firm value. The present paper is the first to investigate how CEO compensation incentives, proxied by PPS, change over a CEO's tenure, and how this change affects firm value.
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The basic insight from a simple dynamic Bayesian learning model is that, over time, the uncertainty associated with a CEO's talent decreases and this, in turn, reduces the risk associated with firm performance. Consequently, the incentive required for the CEO should increase over time. Further, the incentive reaches its maximum when the unknown ability is fully revealed. Accompanying this incentive-increasing process, firm value improves as well. We test these hypotheses by following CEOs when they first take office and examining their PPS over their tenure. We find that PPS increases with tenure, but at a decreasing rate, leading to the convergence of compensation incentives. Further, we conjecture that there is more to learn about a CEO's unknown talent if the CEO's ability is less known at the beginning of the CEO's tenure. A board has more knowledge about its CEO's talent if the CEO is promoted from within compared to a CEO who is hired from outside, or if the inside-promoted CEO has a long history with the firm before 1 Two papers explore the relationship between current compensation and future firm performance. Hanlon, Rajgopal, and Shevlin (2003) examine how option grants relate to firm future operating performance. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) study how excess compensation (a proxy for poor corporate governance based on compensation level) is related to future performance (both operating performance and stock returns). the promotion. We use these two proxies (inside CEOs vs. outside CEOs, or years with a firm before promotion for an inside CEO) as additional measures for board learning, and find further evidence that learning plays an important role in the dynamic process of incentivizing CEOs. 2 The evolution of CEO incentives over time should have important implications for firm valuation. Agency theory suggests that managerial ownership alleviates agency problems and increases firm value. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) 
document that
Tobin's Q first rises with managerial ownership at low levels, then decreases when ownership reaches a high level, due to potential entrenchment effects. However, crosssection-based empirical studies draw serious criticism. As first noted by Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) , any cross-sectional relation between managerial ownership and Tobin's Q should not be observed in equilibrium when ownership is optimally determined. The difference in these two schools of thought apparently stems from very different assumptions about how firms adjust to equilibrium. The former assumes that most firms are not at equilibrium ownership, and that (implicitly) all firms have similar equilibrium levels of ownership, so that we can observe both any deviation of ownership from such equilibrium in the cross-section of firms, and the varying effect of ownership on firm value. On the other hand, the latter school of thought assumes instantaneous adjustment to equilibrium, and a potentially different equilibrium level of ownership for different firms, so that even though we observe cross-sectional variations in ownership levels, they all correspond to an optimal firm value.
Nevertheless, subsequent studies have adopted various approaches to address this endogeneity problem. For example, Core and Larcker (2002) use the event study approach and show that firms that have adopted target ownership plans experience improvement in both ROA (return on assets) and stock returns post-adoption. Other methodologies include fixed-effects (Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia 1999) The gradual incentive increase toward target over a CEO's tenure offers an ideal setting which we can use to examine the relation between incentives and firm value. This is because we focus on the same CEO in the same firm over time compared with a typical cross-sectional study, which may suffer from endogeneity problems, as discussed above.
Specifically, we adopt the change-on-change methodology of Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) and find that the increase in firm value at year t+1 is positively associated with the increase in a CEO's incentive at year t, and this positive association diminishes as a CEO's tenure increases. This is consistent with the hypothesis that firms benefit greatly from a rapid rise in PPS following appointment of a new CEO, and that this effect gradually diminishes as the CEO seasons. We carefully test this effect by controlling for the ownership of firm directors and officers, to ensure that we are not merely picking up important effects of director and officer ownership on firm Tobin's Q, first documented by Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) . When separating inside CEOs from outside CEOs or inside CEOs with the firm for longer periods of time from those with shorter tenures, we find firm value convergence to be faster for firms with CEOs hired from outside (or for 5 inside CEOs with a shorter pre-CEO tenure with the firm) than for those promoted from inside (or for inside CEOs with longer tenure before CEO promotion). These results suggest that for CEOs whose learning process is more pronounced, the effect of learning on the relationship between firm value and incentive is also greater, consistent with the notion that the evolution of CEO incentives over time has important implications for firm valuation.
This paper makes the following two contributions to the compensation and valuation literature. First, we are the first which examines the CEO's incentive process with a dynamic perspective. This is in sharp contrast to the running assumption implicitly used in the empirical compensation literature that incentives are in equilibrium at all times, such that all firm-CEO-years can be treated equally. The systematic impact that this dynamic process has on firm value suggests that subsequent literature cannot simply ignore this adjusting process. Also, assuming that optimal incentive could be achieved through adjustment, Core and Guay (1999) examine how annual compensation is used to adjust incentive to the optimal level. Our paper explicitly examines the time dimension and documents the adjusting process over a CEO's tenure and shows that it actually takes several years for the PPS to reach the equilibrium level. More importantly, while optimality is assumed in Core and Guay (1999), we tie the incentive adjusting process to firm value directly, to show the optimality.
Within the learning framework, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) test both the career concerns hypothesis and the learning hypothesis using the Forbes CEO compensation data set. While these authors find strong supporting evidence for the former hypothesis, they fail to obtain supporting results for the latter hypothesis, due to the simplicity of the 6 research design.
4 Milbourn (2003) uses CEO perceived ability/reputation to explain the cross-sectional heterogeneity in stock-based pay sensitivity. Using four measures, including CEO tenure, as proxies for perceived ability/reputation, Milbourn documents a positive relation between CEO reputation and stock-based compensation. 5 A concurrent work by Cremers and Palia (2010) focuses on the correlation between tenure and CEO compensation by documenting a positive association between tenure and CEO pay level, and a positive, but weak, relation between tenure and CEO PPS. Our study differs from these three papers in the following two aspects. First, though CEO tenure is used in all these papers, it is used as a proxy for very different underlying constructs. In our paper, we first use CEO tenure as a proxy for learning and then complement it with two other learning proxies that provide corroborating evidence. Our evidence is more consistent with the learning hypothesis. In addition, we conduct sensitivity tests to carefully rule out other possible explanations (see Section V). Second and more importantly, we explicitly tie this dynamic incentive process to the improvement of firm value so that we may directly argue for the optimality, as discussed below, that is absent from all these three papers.
Our second contribution derives from valuation analysis. Our paper is the first to use this dynamic process to link the change in current-year incentives to the change in 4 Milbourn (2003) discusses the key difference between Gibbons and Murphy (1992) and his paper as follows: "However, what Theorem 1 says is that, holding tenure fixed, a CEO with a greater  1 will have a greater b*. That is, it is not just tenure that matters, but it is also the CEO's reputation and how that impacts the probabilistic assessment that he will be retained in the future. While a longer tenure can imply that there is less uncertainty over his estimated ability, if the assessment of his ability has dropped, the CEO is more likely to be dismissed. Consequently, this CEO will have a lower pay-for-performance sensitivity." (p. 242). Note that  1 represents CEO talent and b* represents compensation incentive in Milbourn (2003) . We later explicitly explore CEO talent or ability in our sensitivity test in Section 5. 5 CEO ability or talent is typically modeled as an unknown but fixed parameter (see both Gibbons and Murphy 1992; Milbourn 2003) . The manifestation of an unknown ability is a dynamic process, but the ability itself is not. Believing length of CEO tenure (not tenure itself) to be a good proxy for CEO talent, we control for it in one of our sensitivity tests and find our results to be unchanged.
following-year firm value. We show that this incentive process, constantly adjusting toward the optimal level, does bring about the predicted increase in firm value, and that this rise in firm value diminishes as tenure increases. This dynamic perspective better serves the design of our test on the relation between CEO incentives and firm value, as a typical panel data analysis or a cross-sectional data analysis is likely to be subject to the endogeneity problem. To the extent that firms (boards' executive compensation committees) are believed to optimize incentives to achieve the highest firm valuation at all times, any deviation from the current incentive level, whether an increase or decrease, would precipitate a drop in firm value. We show here, however, that in fact, it takes a number of years for CEO incentives to reach the equilibrium level, and that a meaningful increase in firm value is observed concurrently with the increase in incentives during this process.
Our paper differs from studies that use panel data to cross-sectionally examine the relation between managerial ownership and firm value. For example, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) take (large) change for both ownership (including officers and directors) and Tobin's Q and relate current change of ownership to the following year's change in Tobin's Q. Though we adopt the same change-in-change methodology, we follow the same CEO across tenures with the same firm and establish the increase in incentive over a CEO's tenure first, before the methodology is applied. Our paper also differs from Core and Larcker (2002), who use a small sample of 195 firms that have experienced extremely poor performance and then adopted a target incentive plan, to link incentives with performance. These authors use this event setting to address the endogeneity problem and show that ROA and returns improve for the adopting firms. Our study 8 complements theirs, as we show that the improvement in firm value accompanied by the change in incentives happens on a regular basis, not just with adoption of an incentive target plan.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we develop our hypotheses with a simple Bayesian learning model. Section III describes our data sample and research designs. Section IV presents our empirical analyses, and Section V provides sensitivity tests. Finally, Section VI sets forth our conclusions.
II. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
To highlight the dynamic process of change in PPS caused by learning the CEO's unknown talent, we resort to a simple Bayesian setup to develop our hypotheses. We keep the model as simple as possible and mainly follow Bushman, Dai and Wang (2009) . 6 The CEO and the firm have common knowledge about the distribution of CEO talent, but neither party knows the true level of CEO talent (see also Gibbons and Murphy 1992; Holmstrom 1999; Hermalin and Weisbach 2008; Taylor 2010) . CEOs are ex ante identical, with all market participants holding identical prior beliefs over talent. Initially, the firm operates for two periods, t = 1, 2. A contract is signed between the firm and the CEO at the beginning of period one with the understanding that the relationship between the firm and the CEO is to last for two periods. 7 However, the firm updates beliefs about the incumbent CEO's talent at the end of the first period based on the observable, period-9 one performance, and the second-period contract may depend on this updated belief. The per-period production technology is given by:  . Per-period CEO compensation is given as:
where t w is the CEO's compensation for period t, and t a and t b are compensation parameters.
We assume that the CEO is risk-averse and that the firm is risk-neutral. Further, we assume that the period utility function for the CEO is mean-variance with  as a riskaversion parameter for simplicity. We also assume that there is no discounting for either the CEO or the firm. We begin with the second-period contract and the principal solves 
where 1 e is the firm's conjecture about the CEO's first-period effort. Solving the principal's period-two problem for an incumbent CEO, we get:
Now, we move to period one and the principal solves the following problem:
RHS refers to the right-hand side of the incentive comparability constraint and (
is the reservation utility for two periods. We first solve for the agent maximization problem for optimal effort, then we impose equilibrium condition 1 e = 1 e . The solution to the above optimization problem is
Immediately, we see that 
. We reach our first empirical implication as follows.
Empirical implication 1 (H1):
Assuming that the relationship between the CEO and the firm lasts more than one period, the PPS will increase over the CEO's tenure and this increase eventually ends when the incentive reaches its limit.
Empirically, we first test this hypothesis by examining the relation between incentive and CEO tenure assuming that tenure captures the learning process. Since the board has more knowledge about a CEO promoted within the firm than a CEO hired from outside, we then test the learning process separately for inside CEOs and outside CEOs.
We predict that the process is more pronounced for outside CEOs. Finally, among the inside CEOs, we separate those who have been with their firms for a long time from those insiders who have been with their firms for a short period of time prior to promotion, assuming that the longer the CEO worked for the firm before promotion, the more the board knows about the CEO's ability. Thus, we predict that the process for CEOs working for a longer time before promotion is less pronounced.
Regarding the firm value effect from the incentive compensation, we plug the optimal solutions for both periods back into the principal's objective function, and we solve for the profit for period one and period two, respectively.
If we assume that the second-period reservation utility is adjusted accordingly and completely by the updated CEO talent, the difference between u . Then, we see that the secondperiod expected profit would be higher than that from the first period. Again, the difference is driven by the resolution of uncertainty around CEO talent. Also, note that similar to the increase in PPS, the increase in firm value will also reach its limit as the tenure of the CEO with the firm goes to infinity; thus, we have our second empirical implication.
Empirical implication 2 (H2): As the board learns about a CEO's ability (and PPS increases) over the CEO's tenure, firm value rises and this increase in firm value
eventually reaches a fixed point.
Similarly for this hypothesis, we first explore how tenure affects the relation between firm value and incentive. Then, we separately explore how inside CEOs differ from outside CEOs and, among inside CEOs, how those CEOs who have been with their firms for a long period of time differ from those with short tenure prior to promotion.
III. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Data And Key Variables
We use the ExecuComp data set to identify CEOs and extract their compensation, outside CEO are defined based on when the CEO joined the firm, as discussed above.
Years before promotion is the number of years the CEO has been with the firm before being promoted to CEO.
We restrict our sample to CEOs who assumed their positions during the sample period, 1992 to 2007. 9 This is based on the following two considerations: (1) the dynamic process is best examined from the year in which a CEO was hired, and (2) compensation practice has changed significantly over the past several decades (Murphy 2000). The compensation trajectories of CEOs hired before the start of our sample period (for instance, in the 1970s or 1980s or earlier) may be quite different from those of CEOs hired before the 1990s. 10 In addition, to remove interim CEOs, we delete any who held the job for less than two years. 11 Throughout this paper, standard errors are corrected by clustering at the firm-CEO level. To check the robustness of our results, we also create a subsample by further requiring that each CEO's last year with their respective firms also falls within the sample period.
Empirical Design
To test how a CEO's incentives vary over tenure as the board learns about the CEO's unknown skills, we adopt the following specification:
9 To ensure consistency of the incentive measure, we stop our sample at 2007 when the change in option value reporting was adopted in 2006 (FAS 123R). 10 Using all CEOs covered by ExecuComp from 1992 to 2007 yields similar but somewhat weaker results for all analyses performed in the paper. 11 Most were appointed as interim CEOs, and some are actually turnovers; a two-year term being too brief to exhibit any dynamic pattern, we remove them from of our sample.
The parameter associated with Tenure (β 1 ), which captures the increasing incentive process, is expected to be positive, and the parameter associated with Tenure 2 (β 2 ), which captures the convergence of the evolving PPS process, is expected to be negative.
We follow Core and Guay (1999) and Jin (2002) in our selection of control variables, which include Book-to-Market (to proxy for growth opportunity), Free-cashflow problem (to proxy for the agency problem), Sales and its square (to control for size effect), Capital and its square, R&D (to control for the benefits of giving incentives),
Advertising, Investment, and Risk. We add two more controls, the G-index for corporate governance, and Trend and its square. The Trend variable is defined as follows: year 1992 takes the value of 1, year 1993 takes the value of 2, and so on. These last two control variables are particularly important as we want to ensure that tenure captures the dynamic process rather than a time trend.
In introducing our second learning measure, inside and outside CEOs, we define a dummy variable, Outsider, which takes the value of 1 if the CEO is hired from outside, and zero if the CEO is promoted from within the firm. Then, we interact this dummy with 
We expect the parameters associated with the interaction term Outsider* Tenure (β 3 ) and the interaction term Outsider* Tenure 2 (β 4 ) to be significant if there is any difference in the incentive convergence process for these two groups of CEOs. Since
CEOs who are promoted within the firm may have some initial incentive holding before promotion, dummy Outsider will help control for this effect and we expect parameter (α 2 ) to be significantly negative. When considering the third learning measure: years before promotion, we further separate inside CEOs into those who have been with their firms for a long period of time from those with only a short tenure before promotion, and define a dummy (Long) to replace Outsider in equation (10). This dummy takes the value 1 if the CEO has been with the firm longer than the sample median years before promotion, and zero otherwise.
If a CEO's incentives begin to change, the alignment of interests between the CEO and the firm changes as well. Consequently, the firm's value will be affected accordingly. Given that the CEO's incentive has been rising since taking the office, as predicted in our hypothesis 1, we naturally expect that firm value will rise as the incentive rises. In addition, the rise of firm value will diminishes as tenure increases. To test this second hypothesis, we mainly follow the empirical literature on the relation between managerial ownership and firm value.
Specifically, we find the methodology in Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) most suitable for our case, particularly since we document a gradually rising incentive process.
Thus, we locate the change in the independent variable at time t-1 on the right-hand side (in particular the change of incentive) and the change in the dependent variable at time t on the left-hand side (change of Tobin's Q). This yields the following:
The two key parameters for our prediction are β 1 and β 2 . The parameter associated 
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS Summary Statistics
We begin with summary statistics. for CEO tenure is 4.79 (4) years. Note that the statistics for the tenure variable are calculated based on firm-CEO-years. When computed based on CEOs, the mean or median of tenure (the length of CEO tenure for each CEO) is much larger (mean of 9.8 years and median of 8 years). On average, about 27% CEOs were hired from outside, and, for internally promoted CEOs, average tenure with the firm before promotion is 11 years.
For the second sample, the mean (median) for PPS JM is a slightly higher (than for the first sample), $18.75 ($10.03), and the mean (median) for CEO tenure is longer at 6.39 (6) years. On average, about 26% of CEOs were hired from outside and the average tenure with the firm before promotion is 10 years. When tenure increases by one year, for example, the log Jensen-Murphy incentive goes up by 0.22, a 46% increase in incentives in the first year for a CEO who starts with $3 per $1,000 in incentives. The speed of this incentive strengthening process decreases, however, as all the estimates associated with Tenure 2 are negative.
While we find consistent results across all three incentive measures for our main variables of interest, the estimates from control variables behave less so. We believe this happens mainly due to measurement differences among the three incentive measures.
Not all CEOs have finished their tenure with their respective firms in the above sample, though we start with their beginning year. To ensure that the sample selection criteria do not affect our results, we conduct sensitivity tests via a subsample requiring full length of CEO tenure, i.e., both the first and last year with the firm fall into the sample period of 1992-2007, or, further, requiring CEO tenure length to be at least six years. The results from these two subsamples are similar to those reported in Table 3, although the magnitude varies slightly across samples.
14 To further test our learning hypothesis, we separate CEOs promoted from within firms from those hired from outside, as we believe that there is more for a board to learn about an outside CEO than an inside CEO. The empirical results are presented in Table 4 .
We find that the coefficients associated with Further evidence about this learning process is provided in Table 5 , where we focus on inside CEOs only. In this test, we explore another learning measure (Long) to test our hypothesis under the assumption that the longer the CEO has been with the firm before promotion, the more that has been revealed about the CEO's ability (or the less to learn about the CEO's ability 
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significant only for the first two PPS measures, but weak for the third measure. We find that the incentive convergence process is more evident for CEOs with a short period before promotion, consistent with our argument that learning plays an important role in the incentive change. The dummy Long itself is not statistically significant, suggesting no difference between the two groups of inside CEOs. But we do find that initial incentive holding is positive and significant.
Taken as a whole, the above evidence indicates that boards learn about CEOs' unknown abilities and increase their incentives as more is revealed. In the following subsection, we examine how this dynamic process affects firm value.
Firm Value Dynamics over CEO Tenure
If we believe that it takes time for compensation incentives to reach the equilibrium level, the appropriate test should focus on the effect of this process on firm value, as the optimality of incentives must be argued from the shareholders' perspective.
Hence, we test our second hypothesis by relating to firm value the above-documented dynamic process of change (or increase) in incentives.
Standard agency theory stresses the relation between ownership and firm value. To be comparable with the literature on firm value studies, we use PPS JM and CEO
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ownership for this part of the analysis. 15 In column (1) of Table 6 , we notice that change in current incentives is significantly and positively related to the following year's change in Tobin's Q (0.016 with p-value of 0.005), consistent with the notion that the increase in CEO incentives is accompanied by an increase in firm value. This improvement in firm value gradually diminishes, however, as CEO tenure increases. This is indicated by the negative coefficient associated with the interaction term of change in PPS and tenure (-0.001 with p-value of 0.035), which reduces the positive effect of annual changes in incentives on firm value over time. On the issue of whether this positive but diminishing effect may be caused by good CEO performance, we add the preceding two years of performance; the results are shown in column (2) of Table 6 . This column shows that the relation between current change of incentive and future change of firm value becomes slightly stronger both statistically and economically. This also suggests that it is important to control for these performance variables in firm value analyses.
Regarding our control variables, consistent with Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009), we find change in director and officer ownership to have a positive effect on firm value. We find firm size, change in investment, and past stock returns all to be significantly negatively correlated, and analyst coverage to be positively correlated, with firm value.
None of the remaining controls are statistically significant.
Having documented the significant difference between inside CEOs and outside CEOs in their incentive dynamic process, in Table 8 . Again, this provides consistent evidence that gradual increase in incentives helps improve firm value, and the more the board needs to learn, the larger the impact is.
Finally, directly following the literature on firm value, we use CEO ownership.
Since the D&O measure includes CEO ownership, we take out CEO ownership and use the remaining ownership as a separate control. Tables 9, 10 , and 11 present results for all related analyses. When learning is captured by the tenure variable itself, we find that the results in Table 9 to be consistent with those in Table 6 : Current change of CEO ownership has a positive effect on the change in firm value in the following year, and the impact is diminishing over tenure. With respect to outside CEOs (Table 10) , we also find consistent results, as shown in Table 7 . Within insiders only (Table 11) , we similarly find that the effect is weaker if the insiders have been with the firms longer before promotion.
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In sum, with either PPS JM or CEO ownership as the incentive measure, we find that current change or increase in incentives has positive impact on next year's change of firm value; this positive effect weakens with tenure.
V. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
Given that in the literature, the CEO tenure variable has been used to proxy for various underlying constructs, in this section, we explore alternative explanations for the results we ascribe to the effect of learning on the incentive dynamic process. For brevity,
we provide a discussion only, without reporting each individual regression result.
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Career Concerns
Gibbons and Murphy (1992) investigate both a career concerns hypothesis and a learning hypothesis, though they conclude that they find evidence only for career concerns. Specifically, these authors construct two dummy variables based on CEO tenure: close to retirement for the career concerns hypothesis and early tenure for the learning hypothesis. 17 Though the original learning hypothesis states that with years remaining as CEO held constant, incentive increases with tenure as CEO, Gibbons and
Murphy did not specifically test the positive relation between incentive and tenure.
Accordingly, we first replicate their result with their research design and then directly test their learning hypothesis. 16 All the results discussed in this section are available upon request. 17 Note that the difference between the career concerns and the learning hypotheses is that the former holds length of CEO tenure constant, such that PPS will be greater for CEOs closer to, than for CEOs farther from, retirement; whereas the latter holds years remaining as CEO constant, in which case PPS will be greater for CEOs who have more years on the job than for CEOs who have fewer. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) make this distinction clear using two separate hypotheses (their original hypotheses 1 and 2 (p. 487)).
Following Gibbons and Murphy (1992), we define a dummy "Close to
Retirement" that takes the value of 1 for CEOs in their last three years in the position, and zero otherwise; we find the same result as theirs even with all our controls. 18 Then, we include this dummy variable in equation (9) to control for the effect from career concerns, and we find that our results stand. Since this model specification follows exactly the original learning hypothesis stated in Gibbons and Murphy (1992) ("with years remaining as CEO held constant, the slope of the compensation contract increases with tenure as CEO." (p. 487)), we have indeed found the supporting evidence for the learning hypothesis from Gibbons and Murphy (1992) .
In addition to the dummy variable that proxies for career concerns, we use another proxy: CEO retention probability, assuming that the smaller the retention probability, the larger the career concerns the CEO may have. 19 Adding this variable alone or interacting it with the tenure variable has no impact on our results.
CEO Ability
Milbourn (2003) uses CEO perceived ability/reputation to explain the heterogeneity in stock-based pay sensitivity. One proxy for ability is CEO tenure;
Milbourn documents a positive relation between CEO ability and stock-based compensation. In this subsection, we control for ability directly. In particular, we consider the following two ability proxies: stock return performance and CEO tenure length (not tenure) based on the belief that CEOs with higher innate ability are more likely to have better performance and will have longer tenure (length). We add each ability proxy in the added. We find that our results remain while none of the controls load significant, suggesting that CEO ability does not drive the dynamic process observed.
CEO Entrenchment
The CEO tenure variable is also used in the literature as a proxy for entrenchment.
We realize that entrenchment itself should have no implication for increased PPS over we find that our results are unaffected.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper identifies and examines the dynamic process by which the incentives of newly hired CEOs change over time. We find a systematic and substantial increase in PPS to be associated with CEO tenure, consistent with a Bayesian learning process about a CEO's unknown ability over the CEO's tenure. Further separating CEOs into insiders and outsiders, we find that the learning effect is stronger for CEOs hired from outside the firm than those promoted from inside. Similar evidence is also found for inside CEOs who have been with firms for a short period of time compared with those inside CEOs 27 who have been with their firms for a long period of time before becoming CEO. These results suggest that the learning process is more pronounced for CEOs whose ability is less known at the beginning of their tenure.
In relating this dynamic incentive process to firm value, we find that the incremental increase of CEO incentives has significant positive impact on future firm value, and that this positive effect decreases over CEO tenure. We further show that the incremental incentives of CEOs whose ability requires more learning have greater positive impact on future firm value, but their positive effect decreases more quickly as well. All together, the evidence is consistent with our hypotheses that learning about a CEO's unknown ability plays an important role in the CEO's incentive dynamic process and that this dynamic process affects the relationship between incentives and firm value.
One implication of this study is that to the extent that loading incentives in CEOs' early years can be expedited, firm valuation, as measured by Tobin's Q, will increase.
TABLE 1 Descriptive Statistics for PPS Convergence Analysis
The sample period is 1993-2007 and the sample size is 7,512 firm-CEO-years. Jensen-Murphy PPS is the Jenson and Murphy measure of pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) (change in wealth for a $1,000 change in shareholder wealth) converted from the Core and Guay measure (change in wealth for a 1% change in stock price) using the following formula: PPS = (Core and Guay PPS *100,000)/Market value (Core and Guay, 1999); Core-Guay PPS is computed for both options and stocks based on Core and Guay (1999); EGL PPS is Core-Guay PPS divided by total compensation; Outsider is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO is hired from outside the firm, otherwise zero; Years before promotion is the number of years the CEO worked in the firm before being promoted to CEO; Tenure is CEO tenure; Capital is gross plant, property and equipment; R&D is equal to the research and development expenditure if R&D expenditure is not missing, otherwise zero; Missing R&D is an indicator variable that equals 1 if R&D expenditure is missing, otherwise zero; Advertising is the advertisement expenditure; Missing Advertising is an indicator variable that equals 1 if advertisement expenditure is missing, otherwise zero; Investment is the capital expenditure; G-Index is from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003); Idiosyncratic Risk is the standard deviation of the residual from the CAPM model using firms' daily return over the year; Book-to-Market is (book value of assets) / (book value of liabilities + market value of equity); Free-cash-flow problem is equal to zero if the book-to-market ratio is less than 1, otherwise it is the three-year average of [(cash flow from operations -common and preferred stock dividends) / total assets]; CEO age is the age of the CEO. 
TABLE 2 Descriptive Statistics of Incentive on Firm Value
The sample period is 1993-2007 and the sample size is 7,173 firm-CEO-years. Tobin's Q is the market value of assets divided by the book value of asset; PPS is the Jenson and Murphy measure of pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) (change in wealth for a $1,000 change in shareholder wealth) converted from the Core and Guay measure (change in wealth for a 1% change of stock price) using the following formula: PPS = (Core and Guay PPS *100,000)/Market value (Core and Guay, 1999); CEO ownership is the percentage of ownership held by the CEO; Outsider is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO is hired from outside the firm, otherwise zero; Years before promotion is the number of years the CEO worked in the firm before being promoted to CEO; Tenure is CEO tenure; D&O Ownership is the percentage of ownership held by the directors and officers (includes CEO ownership); Sales is sales revenue; Capital is gross plant, property, and equipment; R&D is equal to the research and development expenditure if R&D expenditure is not missing, otherwise zero; Missing R&D is an indicator variable that equals 1 if R&D expenditure is missing, otherwise zero; Advertising is the advertisement expenditure; Missing Advertising is an indicator variable that equals 1 if advertisement expenditure is missing, otherwise zero; Investment is the capital expenditure; G-Index is from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003); Idiosyncratic Risk is the standard deviation of the residual from the CAPM model using firms' daily return over the year; Cash Flow is the cash flow from operations; Analyst Coverage is the average number of analysts that follow a firm during a fiscal year; Became Financially Constrained (Became Financially Unconstrained) is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm becomes financially constrained (unconstrained) according to the definition of Whited and Wu (2006) 
TABLE 3 PPS Convergence over Tenure
The sample period is 1993-2007. Jensen-Murphy PPS is the Jenson and Murphy measure of pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) (change in wealth for a $1,000 change in shareholder wealth) converted from the Core and Guay measure (change in wealth for a 1% change of stock price) using the following formula: PPS = (Core and Guay PPS *100,000)/Market value (Core and Guay, 1999); EGL PPS is Core-Guay PPS divided by total compensation; Tenure is CEO tenure; Trend is year -1992; Sales is firm annual sales revenue; Capital is gross plant, property, and equipment; R&D is equal to the research and development expenditure if R&D expenditure is not missing, otherwise zero; Missing R&D is an indicator variable that equals 1 if R&D expenditure is missing, otherwise zero; Advertising is the advertisement expenditure; Missing Advertising is an indicator variable that equals 1 if advertisement expenditure is missing, otherwise zero; Investment is the capital expenditure; G-Index is from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003); Idiosyncratic Risk is the standard deviation of the residual from the CAPM model using firms' daily return over the year; Book-to-Market is (book value of assets) / (book value of liabilities + market value of equity); Free-cash-flow problem is equal to zero if the book-to-market ratio is less than 1, otherwise it is the three-year average of [(cash flow from operations -common and preferred stock dividends)/total assets]; CEO age is the age of the CEO. Industry dummies are included in all columns. The standard error of OLS regression is corrected using the Huber-White procedure with clustering by CEO. The sample period is 1993-2007. Jensen-Murphy PPS is the Jenson and Murphy measure of pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) (change in wealth for a $1,000 change shareholder wealth) converted from the Core and Guay measure (change in wealth for a 1% change in stock price) using the following formula: PPS = (Core and Guay PPS *100,000)/Market value (Core and Guay, 1999); EGL PPS is Core-Guay PPS divided by total compensation; Tenure is CEO tenure; Outsider is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO comes from another firm or came to the firm within one year before becoming CEO, otherwise zero; Trend is year -1992; Sales is firm annual sales revenue; Capital is gross plant, property, and equipment; R&D is equal to the research and development expenditure if R&D expenditure is not missing, otherwise zero; Missing R&D is an indicator variable that equals 1 if R&D expenditure is missing, otherwise zero; Advertising is the advertisement expenditure; Missing Advertising is an indicator variable that equals 1 if advertisement expenditure is missing, otherwise zero; Investment is the capital expenditure; G-Index is from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003); Idiosyncratic Risk is the standard deviation of the residual from the CAPM model using firms' daily return over the year; Book-to-Market is (book value of assets) / (book value of liabilities + market value of equity); Free-cash-flow problem is equal to zero if the book-to-market ratio is less than 1, otherwise it is the three-year average of [(cash flow from operations -common and preferred stock dividends)/total assets]; CEO age is the age of the CEO. Industry dummies are included in all columns. The standard error of OLS regression is corrected using the Huber-White procedure with clustering by CEO. 
TABLE 5 PPS Convergence over Tenure: Inside CEOs only
The sample period is 1993-2007. Jensen-Murphy PPS is the Jenson and Murphy measure of pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) (change in wealth for a $1,000 change in shareholder wealth) converted from the Core and Guay measure (change in wealth for a 1% change in stock price) using the following formula: PPS = (Core and Guay PPS *100,000)/Market value (Core and Guay, 1999); EGL PPS is Core-Guay PPS divided by total compensation; Tenure is CEO tenure; Long is an indicator variable that equals 1 if years before promotion is greater than the median, and zero otherwise and Years before Promotion is the number of years the CEO worked in the firm before being promoted to CEO; Initial incentives is the Jensen-Murphy incentives measure the year before being promoted to CEO; Trend is year -1992; Sales is firm annual sales revenue; Capital is gross plant, property, and equipment; R&D is equal to the research and development expenditure if R&D expenditure is not missing, otherwise zero; Missing R&D is an indicator variable that equals 1 if R&D expenditure is missing, otherwise zero; Advertising is the advertisement expenditure; Missing Advertising is an indicator variable that equals 1 if advertisement expenditure is missing, otherwise zero; Investment is the capital expenditure; G-Index is from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003); Idiosyncratic Risk is the standard deviation of the residual from the CAPM model using firms' daily return over the year; Book-to-Market is (book value of assets) / (book value of liabilities + market value of equity); Free-cash-flow problem is equal to zero if the book-to-market ratio is less than 1, otherwise it is the three-year average of [(cash flow from operations -common and preferred stock dividends)/total assets]; CEO age is the age of the CEO. Industry dummies are included in all columns. The standard error of OLS regression is corrected using the HuberWhite procedure with clustering by CEO. The sample period is 1993-2007. Tobin's Q is market value of asset divided by book value of asset; PPS is the Jenson and Murphy measure of pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) (change in wealth for a $1,000 change in shareholder wealth) converted from the Core and Guay measure (change in wealth for every 1% change of stock price) using the following formula: PPS = (Core and Guay PPS *100,000)/Market value (Core and Guay, 1999) ; Tenure is CEO tenure; D&O Ownership is the percentage of ownership held by the directors and officers; Sales is firm annual sales revenue; Capital is gross plant, property, and equipment; R&D is equal to the research and development expenditure if R&D expenditure is not missing, otherwise zero; Missing R&D is an indicator variable that equals 1 if R&D expenditure is missing, otherwise zero; Advertising is the advertisement expenditure; Missing Advertising is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the advertisement expenditure is missing, otherwise zero; Investment is the capital expenditure; G-Index is from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003); Idiosyncratic Risk is the standard deviation of the residual from the CAPM model using firms' daily return over the year; Cash Flow is cash flow from operations; Analyst Coverage is the average number of analysts that follow a firm during a fiscal year; Became Financially Constrained (Became Financially Unconstrained) is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm becomes financially constrained (unconstrained) according to the definition of Whited and Wu (2006) ; Trend is year -1992; Turnover NYSE (NASDAQ) is the annualized average daily NASDAQ turnover if traded on NASDAQ, otherwise zero; Return is the industry adjusted annual return. The standard error of OLS regression is corrected using the Huber-White procedure with clustering by CEO.
Dependent variable = ΔTobin's Q t-1 to t
(1) The sample period is 1993-2007. Tobin's Q is market value of an asset divided by book value of that asset; PPS is the Jenson and Murphy measure of pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) (change in wealth for a $1,000 change in shareholder wealth) converted from the Core and Guay measure (change in wealth for a 1% change in stock price) using the following formula: PPS = (Core and Guay PPS *100,000)/Market value (Core and Guay, 1999) ; Tenure is CEO tenure; Outsider is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO is hired from outside the firm, otherwise zero; D&O Ownership is the percentage of ownership held by the directors and officers; Sales is firm annual sales revenue; Capital is gross plant, property, and equipment; R&D is equal to the research and development expenditure if R&D expenditure is not missing, otherwise zero; Missing R&D is an indicator variable that equals 1 if R&D expenditure is missing, otherwise zero; Advertising is the advertisement expenditure; Missing Advertising is an indicator variable that equals 1 if advertisement expenditure is missing, otherwise zero; Investment is the capital expenditure; G-Index is from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003); Idiosyncratic Risk is the standard deviation of the residual from the CAPM model using firms' daily return over the year; Cash Flow is the cash flow from operations; Analyst Coverage is the average number of analysts that follow a firm during a fiscal year; Became Financially Constrained (Became Financially Unconstrained) is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm becomes financially constrained (unconstrained) according to the definition of Whited and Wu (2006); Trend is year -1992; Turnover NYSE (NASDAQ) annualized average daily NASDAQ turnover if traded on NASDAQ, otherwise zero; Return is the industry adjusted annual return. The standard error of OLS regression is corrected using the Huber-White procedure with clustering by CEO. The sample period is 1993-2007. Tobin's Q is market value of an asset divided by book value of that asset; PPS is the Jenson and Murphy measure of pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) (change in wealth for a $1,000 change in shareholder wealth) converted from the Core and Guay measure (change in wealth for a 1% change in stock price) using the following formula: PPS = (Core and Guay PPS *100,000)/Market value (Core and Guay, 1999); Tenure is CEO tenure; Long is an indicator variable that equals 1 if years before promotion is greater than the median, and zero otherwise, and Years before Promotion is the number of years the CEO worked in the firm before being promoted to CEO; D&O Ownership is the percentage of ownership held by the directors and officers; Sales is firm annual sales revenue; Capital is gross plant, property, and equipment; R&D is equal to the research and development expenditure if R&D expenditure is not missing, otherwise zero; Missing R&D is an indicator variable that equals 1 if R&D expenditure is missing, otherwise zero; Advertising is the advertisement expenditure; Missing Advertising is an indicator variable that equals 1 if advertisement expenditure is missing, otherwise zero; Investment is the capital expenditure; G-Index is from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003); Idiosyncratic Risk is the standard deviation of the residual from the CAPM model using firms' daily return over the year; Cash Flow is the cash flow from operations; Analyst Coverage is the average number of analysts that follow a firm during a fiscal year; Became Financially Constrained (Became Financially Unconstrained) is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm becomes financially constrained (unconstrained) according to the definition of Whited and Wu (2006); Trend is year -1992; Turnover NYSE (NASDAQ) is annualized average daily NASDAQ turnover if traded on NASDAQ, otherwise zero; Return is the industry adjusted annual return. The standard error of OLS regression is corrected using the Huber-White procedure with clustering by CEO. Dependent variable = ΔTobin's Q t-1 to t
(1) The sample period is 1993-2007. Tobin's Q is market value of an asset divided by book value of that asset; CEO ownership is the percentage of ownership held by the CEO; Tenure is CEO tenure; D&O Ownership is the percentage of ownership held by the directors and officers excluding CEO's ownership; Sales is the firm annual sales revenue; Capital is gross plant, property, and equipment; R&D is equal to the research and development expenditure if R&D expenditure is not missing, otherwise zero; Missing R&D is an indicator variable that equals 1 if R&D expenditure is missing, otherwise zero; Advertising is the advertisement expenditure; Missing Advertising is an indicator variable that equals 1 if advertisement expenditure is missing, otherwise zero; Investment is the capital expenditure; G-Index is from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) ; Idiosyncratic Risk is the standard deviation of the residual from the CAPM model using firms' daily return over the year; Cash Flow is the cash flow from operations; Analyst Coverage is the average number of analysts that follow a firm during a fiscal year; Became Financially Constrained (Became Financially Unconstrained) is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm becomes financially constrained (unconstrained) according to the definition of Whited and Wu (2006) ; Trend is year -1992; Turnover NYSE (NASDAQ) is annualized average daily NASDAQ turnover if traded on NASDAQ, otherwise zero; Return is the industry adjusted annual return. The standard error of OLS regression is corrected using the Huber-White procedure with clustering by CEO. The sample period is 1993-2007. Tobin's Q is market value of an asset divided by book value of that asset; CEO ownership is the percentage of ownership held by the CEO; Tenure is CEO tenure; Outsider is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO is hired from outside the firm, otherwise zero; D&O Ownership is the percentage of ownership held by the directors and officers; Sales is firm annual sales revenue; Capital is gross plant, property, and equipment; R&D is equal to the research and development expenditure if R&D expenditure is not missing, otherwise zero; Missing R&D is an indicator variable that equals 1 if R&D expenditure is missing, otherwise zero; Advertising is the advertisement expenditure; Missing Advertising is an indicator variable that equals 1 if advertisement expenditure is missing, otherwise zero; Investment is the capital expenditure; G-Index is from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) ; Idiosyncratic Risk is the standard deviation of the residual from the CAPM model using firms' daily return over the year; Cash Flow is the cash flow from operations; Analyst Coverage is the average number of analysts that follow a firm during a fiscal year; Became Financially Constrained (Became Financially Unconstrained) is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm becomes financially constrained (unconstrained) according to the definition of Whited and Wu (2006) ; Trend is year -1992; Turnover NYSE (NASDAQ) annualized average daily NASDAQ turnover if traded on NASDAQ, otherwise zero; Return is the industry adjusted annual return. The standard error of OLS regression is corrected using the Huber-White procedure with clustering by CEO.
(1) The sample period is 1993-2007. Tobin's Q is market value of an asset divided by book value of that asset; CEO ownership is the percentage of ownership held by the CEO; Tenure is CEO tenure; Long is an indicator variable that equals 1 if years before promotion is greater than the median, and zero otherwise and Years before Promotion is the number of years the CEO worked in the firm before being promoted to CEO; D&O Ownership is the percentage of ownership held by the directors and officers; Sales is the firm annual sales revenue; Capital is gross plant, property, and equipment; R&D is equal to the research and development expenditure if R&D expenditure is not missing, otherwise zero; Missing R&D is an indicator variable that equals 1 if R&D expenditure is missing, otherwise zero; Advertising is the advertisement expenditure; Missing Advertising is an indicator variable that equals 1 if advertisement expenditure is missing, otherwise zero; Investment is the capital expenditure; G-Index is from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003); Idiosyncratic Risk is the standard deviation of the residual from the CAPM model using firms' daily return over the year; Cash Flow is the cash flow from operations; Analyst Coverage is the average number of analysts that follow a firm during a fiscal year; Became Financially Constrained (Became Financially Unconstrained) is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm becomes financially constrained (unconstrained) according to the definition of Whited and Wu (2006) ; Turnover NYSE (NASDAQ) is annualized average daily NASDAQ turnover if traded on NASDAQ, otherwise zero; Trend is year -1992; Return is the industry adjusted annual return. The standard error of OLS regression is corrected using the Huber-White procedure with clustering by CEO. Dependent = ΔTobin's Q t-1 to t
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